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Abstract 
 
This paper evaluates which factors influence the European Parliament’s decision-making, 
based on a case study: the 2012 proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation. 
Following a ‘competitive testing’ approach, six different hypotheses are successively 
challenged in order to explain why the EP adopted a fundamental rights- oriented position. 
The first three factors relate to the internal organization of the EP’s work, i.e. the role 
played by the lead committee, by the rapporteur and by secretariat officials. The last three 
factors are external-related, i.e. lobbying activities, outside events and institutional 
considerations. 
Based on the empirical findings, it is argued that even though the EP’s position is due to a 
range of various factors, some of them prove to be more relevant than others, in particular 
the rapporteur and lead committee’s roles. New institutionalism theories also provide a 
comprehensive explanation for the EP’s willingness to achieve a fundamental rights 
oriented outcome. 
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Three thousands, nine hundred and ninety-eight. This is the total number of amendments 
that have been submitted in the European Parliament (EP) regarding the proposal for a 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).1 This very high figure illustrates the great 
interest in this dossier, which can be explained by the large scope of the proposal and, 
more importantly, by its sensitiveness. In order to deal with this issue, European Union 
decision-makers have to reconcile two legitimate, yet contradictory, objectives: the 
protection vs. the free flow of personal data. 
On one hand, the right to data protection must be strongly guaranteed so as to 
ensure that personal data are processed in legitimate ways and that individuals remain in 
control of their own data. This right does not aim at protecting data as such, but rather at 
“protecting individuals towards the processing of data relating to them”.2 It corresponds to 
the fundamental rights dimension of the data protection reform. 
On the other hand, there is a legitimate need for the free flow of personal data. This 
refers to the economic dimension of the GDPR proposal. Personal data constitute an 
“important currency in the new millennium”, with a growing monetary value attached to 
them.3 In order to build their economic strategies, businesses more and more rely on 
personal data and thus need to be able to process those data without too many obstacles, 
so as to remain competitive in the growing digital market.  
The GDPR proposal, published on January 25th, 2012, aims at replacing Directive 
95/46/EC,4 which was the previous EU legal instrument regulating the processing of data, 
but which has become obsolete – notably in regards to the tremendous developments in 
I would like to thank all those who have made this work possible, Professor Olivier Costa and 
Thomas Pellerin-Carlin, for their guidance in the conducting of this research as well as all the 
people who kindly spared some of their time to share with me their valuable outlooks on the topic. 
So, special thanks to the MEPs and their parliamentary assistants, to EU officials and to 
representatives and experts on data protection for their precious insights. I have very much 
appreciated their opinions, although I should mention here that the hypotheses tested in this paper 
only reflect my personal ideas and in no case those of the interviewees. 
 
 
1 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM(2012)11 final, Brussels, 25 January 2012. 
2 Ludovic Coudray, La protection des données personnelles dans l’Union européenne, Naissance et 
consécration d’un droit fondamental, Leipzig, Editions universitaires européennes, 2010, p. 9. 
3 Paul Schwartz, ‘Property, Privacy, and Personal Data’, Harvard Law Review, vol. 117, no. 7, 2004, p. 
2056. 
4 ‘Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data’, Official Journal of the European Union, L281, 23 November 1995, pp. 31-50. 
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new technologies ever since. The new proposal hence seeks to update and reinforce the 
previous norms, mainly by establishing a single set of rules in the European Union, in order 
to simplify cross-border transfers of data and to reduce costs for businesses. The goal is 
also to safeguard the right of individuals to data protection, which is now explicitly 
recognized in Article 8 of the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights.5 
The ordinary legislative procedure applies for this legislative file, and as a result 
both the Council and the European Parliament (EP) have their say. The latter first agreed 
on its first reading position on March 12th, 2014.6 The legislative resolution was backed by 
an overwhelming majority of MEPs. In the lead committee, 'Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs' (LIBE), the draft report was adopted with 51 votes in favor, only 1 against 
and 3 abstentions. Then, in plenary, the report got 621 votes in favor, 10 against, and 22 
abstentions. The unity of the Parliament on such a wide and sensitive dossier may appear 
as surprising, or at least as unexpected. The existing tension between the economic and 
fundamental rights dimensions of the proposal could have divided the institution. Instead, 
the EP seems to stand quite united about this issue. 
When looking at how this democratically elected assembly did position itself on the 
proposal, i.e. where did it strike the balance between fundamental rights aspects and 
economic needs, it seems that this institution has favored the protection of personal data. 
As a matter of fact, both MEPs and outside stakeholders consider that the Parliament’s 
text is heading towards a greater protection of personal data.7 Furthermore, the EP 
resolution seems to contain several more protective provisions than the initial proposal of 
the European Commission, one of the most symbolic examples being the increase of the 
amount of sanctions for businesses that do not respect EU provisions.8 Finally, the EP’s 
position seems all the more fundamental rights- oriented when compared to the Council’s. 
5 ‘Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’, Official Journal of the European Union, C326, 
26 October 2012, pp. 391-407. 
6 European Parliament, Legislative resolution of 12 March 2014 on the proposal for a regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement on such data (General Data Protection Regulation), 
P7_TA(2014)0212, Strasbourg, 12 March 2014. 
7 Interview with Axel Voss, MEP (Germany, EPP), shadow rapporteur for the GDPR proposal, 
Strasbourg, 11 February 2015, and interview with a representative from the digital industry sector, 
17 April 2015. 
8 Amendment 188 concerning Article 79. 
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It is rightly illustrated by the Council’s preference for more flexibility and more exemptions, 
as well as for a ‘risk-based approach’.9 
Hence, with regards to the ‘balance’ between protection and free flow of personal 
data, the EP could be depicted as the ‘protector’ of the fundamental right to protection of 
personal data. Thus, the research question of this paper is the following: How can the 
European Parliament’s protective position regarding the GDPR proposal be best 
explained?  
This study aims at identifying the main factors which have led the EP to adopt a 
protective stand on the GDPR proposal. While existing literature has mainly focused on the 
role of partisan and national cleavages in the building of EP’s positions,10 this paper 
intends to examine other determinants of action and to adopt a more comprehensive 
approach, by looking at both ‘internal’ factors, e.g. the influence of the lead committee, and 
‘external’ ones, such as the role played by outside events. These potential factors of 
explanation seem particularly interesting to test, because they have been the object of 
fewer studies than national and ideological factors. 
Hence, a ‘competitive testing’ approach will be used.11 The goal is to test a range of 
different theories and hypotheses, in order to identify which one(s) can best explain the 
way the EP has dealt with the issue. Six hypotheses will be successively examined; the 
first three are focusing on ‘internal’ factors (1), while the last three are ‘external’ oriented 
(2). The conclusion will underline which factors can best explain the Parliament’s position 
regarding this proposal. 
 
1. Explaining the protective position of the European Parliament: the role of 
internal factors 
This part of the paper focuses on how the functioning and distribution of power inside the 
Parliament may have led to this position. Three different factors which might have 
influenced the final outcome are examined: the work of the lead committee in charge of 
9 Council of the European Union, ‘Inter-institutional file: 2012/0011 (COD)’, Document no.13772/14, 
Brussels, 3 October 2014. 
10 Charlotte Burns, ‘Co-decision and Inter-Committee Conflict in the European Parliament post-
Amsterdam’, Government and Opposition, vol. 41, no. 2, 2006, p. 232. 
11 Joseph Jupille, James A. Caporaso & Jeffrey T. Checkel, ‘Integrating Institutions: Rationalism, 
Constructivism, and the Study of the European Union’, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 36, no. 1-2, 
2003, pp. 7-40.  
 10 
                                                 
the dossier (2.1), the involvement of the designated rapporteur (2.2) and the activities of 
the LIBE secretariat (2.3). 
The socio-organizational hypothesis: the influence of LIBE as the lead committee 
The way the legislative work inside the Parliament is structured gives a lot of power 
to committees. For each proposal published by the Commission, a standing committee is 
designated as the lead one, which means that it is in charge of drafting the EP report, while 
a few other committees may be designated as opinion-giving committees.  
Interestingly, this structure allows for lead committees to exert a significant 
influence over the position of the Parliament as a whole, for two main reasons, 
organizational and informational. On the organizational side, the impact of the lead 
committee can be explained by the fact that it is in charge of the file throughout the whole 
legislative process, from the first reading to the conciliation phase, and that it can amend 
the text more easily than MEPs from other committees.12 Secondly, MEPs from the lead 
committee also have an “informational advantage”.13 The idea is that a responsible 
committee is better placed to amend a proposal because it possesses greater knowledge 
on the matter. The lead committee influences the preferences of MEPs from other 
committees, who are expected to trust the opinions of the ‘experts’.14  
The first hypothesis I intend to test is also based on existing literature concerning 
the LIBE committee in particular. It has indeed been argued that this standing committee 
was a “strange animal” within the Parliament, mainly because, before 2005, this committee 
had to deal principally with consultative files, allowing its Members to take “more radical” 
positions on certain issues than when MEPs have to work under co-decision procedure.15 
This is the reason why this committee could be more demanding regarding fundamental 
rights issues.16 
12 Nikoleta Yordanova, Organising the European Parliament: The Role of Committees and their 
Legislative Influence, Colchester, ECPR Press, 2013, p. 142. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Nils Ringe, Who Decides, and How? Preferences, Uncertainty, and Policy Choice in the European 
Parliament, New York, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 37. 
15 Ariadna Ripoll-Servent, ‘Playing the co-decision game: is the European Parliament striking a 
balance between liberty and security?’, UACES Annual Conference, Angers, 3-6 September, 2009, p. 
5, in Camino Mortera-Martinez, Deconstructing Robin Hood: SWIFT, a test case for the European 
Parliament’s fight for liberty?, Thesis from the College of Europe, 2010-2011, p. 19. 
16  Camino Mortera-Martinez, Deconstructing Robin Hood: SWIFT, a test case for the European 
Parliament’s fight for liberty?, Thesis from the College of Europe, 2010-2011, p. 23. 
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For these reasons, the first hypothesis I intend to confront to the empirical findings 
is the following: 
Hypothesis 1: Because of the influence it could exert as the lead committee and because of 
its fundamental rights oriented preferences, the LIBE committee has made the 
Parliament’s position more protective. 
A unanimous recognition of the key influence of LIBE over the EP’s position 
All the interviews I conducted clearly tend to show that the LIBE committee indeed 
has a more protective view on the matter, and that it did have an influence over the EP’s 
position on the GDPR proposal.  
The differences in terms of preferences between the LIBE committee and the 
opinion-giving committees seem to lie in the MEPs’ previous background. As MEP and 
shadow rapporteur Axel Voss pointed out, Members from LIBE “are always coming from 
the fundamental rights side”, while, for the other opinion-giving committees, “they are 
coming from (…) their main areas, so this was then more…probably economically 
orientated”.17 Committees such as IMCO (‘Internal Market and Consumer Protection’) and 
ITRE (‘Industry, Research and Energy’) are portrayed as more business-oriented than 
LIBE.18  
Looking now at LIBE’s influence over the final outcome, a first indication can be 
drawn up from the large majority that the report finally got in plenary. In line with the 
informational theory, this large support may be explained by the expertise owned by the 
LIBE members. Many interviewees indeed highlighted the fact that LIBE was the only 
committee with adequate knowledge to deal with such fundamental rights issues. Thomas 
Van der Valk, parliamentary assistant of MEP Sophia In’t’Veld, explained that 
“if you have the Industry committee or the Internal Market committee deciding 
rules that have such deep impacts on the personal lives of citizens, then you will 
not have the people with the right skills to work on it.”19 
 
The fact that the LIBE committee did have a great influence over the final outcome 
in plenary has been widely recognized, almost all interviewees admitting that this would 
17 Interview with MEP Axel Voss, op. cit. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Phone interview with Thomas Van der Valk, parliamentary assistant of MEP Sophia In’t’Veld 
(Netherlands, ALDE), shadow rapporteur for the GDPR proposal, 21 April 2015. 
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have been very different, i.e. more economically oriented and less protective, if another 
committee would have been in charge of the GDPR proposal. Here is a meaningful extract: 
“If you would have another committee in the lead, if I exaggerate, we would have ended up 
with very little rules on protection”.20 
Therefore, to answer the first hypothesis, the LIBE committee does have a more 
protective view on the GDPR proposal than other committees – especially compared to 
IMCO and ITRE –, and it did influence the final EP’s position. 
When going further into the details, one might come to the conclusion that, inside 
committees, only a few individuals have influence over each specific dossier, since 
responsibility for a file is always delegated to a reduced number of MEPs.21  
 The individuals hypothesis: the lead role of the rapporteur 
Besides the committee structure of the Parliament, the repartition of roles within 
committees is also very well organized. For each proposal issued by the European 
Commission, one MEP is appointed as rapporteur, alongside shadow rapporteurs for each 
other political groups. Once appointed, a rapporteur is in charge of steering a given 
proposal within the Parliament throughout the whole legislative process.22  
The influence of rapporteurs over the proposals they are in charge of is widely 
recognized among scholars. Hausemer, for instance, argues that “the system of 
rapporteurships enables individual legislators to take responsibility for, and exert influence 
over, the policy position of the Parliament as a whole”.23 Two main reasons may explain 
the rapporteurs’ influence: their “agenda-setting power”24 as well as their “information 
advantages”25 – thereby mirroring the organizational and informational arguments made 
previously. 
The former argument corresponds to the fact that rapporteurs play a key role in 
organizing debates and hearings about an issue, and even in submitting the draft report to 
vote: rapporteurs can therefore easily put a specific topic on the agenda of their 
20 Ibid. 
21 Nils Ringe, op. cit., p. 55. 
22 Ibid., p. 15. 
23 Pierre Hausemer, ‘Participation and Political Competition in Committee Report Allocation’, 
European Union Politics, vol. 7, no. 4, 2006, p. 509. 
24  Rory Costello and Robert Thomson, ‘The Policy Impact of Leadership in Committees: 
Rapporteurs’ influence on the European Parliament’s opinions’, European Union Politics, vol. 11, no. 
2, 2010, p. 235. 
25 Ibid., p. 220. 
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committee. Also, during plenary votes, the opinion of the rapporteur on each and every 
amendment is indicated by the President, and the rapporteur can even take the floor to 
detail his or her position on any specific amendment.26 These kinds of ‘privileges’ give the 
rapporteur some leeway. 
Most prominently, their informational advantage is due to the fact that they usually 
get greater knowledge over the proposal than any other committee members.27 This can 
lead to a situation where the other MEPs are dependent upon the rapporteur’s knowledge, 
thereby offering to rapporteurs some leeway to advance their own interests.28 
If the rapporteur Jan Phlipp Albrecht can therefore be expected to have had a key 
influence over the EP’s position on the GDPR proposal, it can also be expected that he 
made it more fundamental rights oriented, because of his belonging to the Greens/EFA 
political group – a group which is known for being demanding in terms of protection of 
personal data. 
As a result, the second hypothesis I intend to confront to the empirical findings is 
the following: 
Hypothesis 2: Because of his privileged position in the LIBE committee as rapporteur and 
of his belonging to the Greens, MEP Jan Philipp Albrecht has impacted the final content of 
the EP’s position, making it more fundamental rights oriented. 
The recognized expertise and leadership of the rapporteur 
Based on the interviews I conducted, it seems quite clear that the rapporteur Jan 
Phlipp Albrecht has a protective vision of the way personal data shall be processed. MEP 
Marju Lauristin e.g. said that he was “more on [the] protective side” because of his law 
background, 29 while a representative from the digital industry sector rather explained MEP 
Albrecht’s protective position by his political affiliation.30 
When trying to measure the rapporteur's influence over the EP’s position, several 
elements tend to show that it was a strong one. A first indication of that, again, is the huge 
majority of MEPs who voted in favor of the report, both within the LIBE committee and in 
26 Olivier Costa, Le Parlement européen, assemblée délibérante, Bruxelles, Editions de l’Université de 
Bruxelles, 2001, p. 405. 
27 Rory Costello and Robert Thomson, op. cit., pp. 221-222. 
28 Ibid., p. 220. 
29 Interview with Marju Lauristin, MEP (Estonia, S&D), shadow rapporteur for the GDPR proposal, 
Brussels, 13 April 2015. 
30 Phone interview with a representative from the digital industry sector, op. cit. 
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plenary. The success for this overwhelming support has been largely attributed to the 
rapporteur. 31  The fact that he got a large majority is all the more striking and 
commendable that MEP Albrecht’s appointment as rapporteur had been contested at the 
very beginning of the process, a few political groups having actually put his appointment 
as rapporteur to a vote, notably because they disagreed on giving such a big and 
important report to a small political group.32 
In the end, the rapporteur’s leadership on this dossier has been widely recognized. 
MEP Lauristin for instance depicted MEP Albrecht as “a common accepted leader on this 
issue”.33 Mr. Van der Valk also considered that the fact the Parliament “took a very strong 
position on creating protective privacy rules (…) [was] a big accomplishment of Mr. 
Albrecht”.34 
The widely recognized influence of the rapporteur over the EP’s position can be 
mainly explained by both his expertise on the issue and his very active involvement. 
Regarding the former element – which mirrors the informational theory again –, Jan 
Philipp Albrecht has studied law, which puts him in a good position to understand data 
protection issues. Most interviewees mentioned the fact that he indeed was very 
knowledgeable on the topic.35 Furthermore, MEP Albrecht’s dedication has been largely 
recognized. He has been very vocal, both within the Parliament and externally, towards the 
other institutions and in the media. A representative of the industry sector e.g. underlined 
that 
“he’s been able to keep the press very interested and involved in the topic and 
making sure that the Parliament’s voice was still heard even though they 
technically haven’t been working on the file for one year”.36 
 
MEP Albrecht’s engagement can be further illustrated by his strong will to be in charge of 
this proposal. Indeed, by not spending points on other previous reports, he and his political 
group acted strategically in order to have a greater chance of being in charge of the GDPR 
report.37 
31 Interview with Thomas Van der Valk, op. cit. 
32 Interview with Jan Philipp Albrecht, MEP (Germany, Greens), Strasbourg, 11 February 2015. 
33 Interview with MEP Marju Lauristin, op. cit. 
34 Interview with Thomas Van der Valk, op. cit. 
35 Interview with an official, LIBE secretariat, European Parliament, Brussels, 25 March 2015. 
36 Interview with a representative from the digital industry sector, op. cit. 
37 Interview with MEP Jan Philipp Albrecht, op. cit. 
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This leads me to conclude that, because of his recognized expertise and active 
involvement, the rapporteur has had a great influence over the final EP outcome, making it 
more fundamental rights oriented. 
As Marshall rightly points out, because the system of rapporteurship gives “power in 
the hands of a single inadequately resourced individual, (…) [it] generates [an] exceptional 
need for objective policy information. Secretariat officials, as the best available option, 
meet this demand”.38 This is why it is now needed to assess the secretariat officials’ 
influence over the EP’s position. 
 The administrative hypothesis: the ‘hidden’ work of the secretariat 
Committees' secretariats, i.e. officials in charge of assisting each specific standing 
committee, fulfill four main functions: 
- “Technical-administrative assistance, such as the organization of meetings; 
- Technical-substantive assistance, such as the provision of procedural and legal 
advice; 
- Research, such as the collection of relevant information for reports; 
- Political assistance, such as the provision of advice on how to achieve political 
compromises”.39 
Secretariats might therefore exert influence over the EP’s works through all these different 
tasks they fulfill, especially the two last ones as they are more content-related.40 
An interesting study by Marshall illustrates a possible bias in the information 
provided by secretariat officials.41 It is argued that, because officials also need information 
from outside, lobbyists seek to fulfill this mission, thereby altering the impartiality of the 
secretariat’s knowledge. Hence, while rapporteurs usually rely upon the resources and 
expertise coming from secretariat officials, which they perceive to be independent, 
38 David Marshall, ‘Do rapporteurs receive independent expert policy advice? Indirect lobbying via 
the European Parliament’s committee secretariat’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 19, no. 9, 
2012, p. 1392. 
39 Andreja Pegan, An Analysis of Legislative Assistance in the European Parliament, Doctorate from the 
University of Luxembourg presented on 27 March 2015 in Luxembourg, p. 83. 
40 Christine Neuhold and Elissaveta Radulova, ‘The involvement of administrative players in the EU 
decision-making process’, in H.C.H. Hofmann and A.H. Türk (eds.), EU Administrative Governance, 
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006, p. 57. 
41 David Marshall, op. cit., pp. 1377-1395. 
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lobbyists have developed a “strategic practice of indirectly lobbying rapporteurs via their 
principal source of information: the committee secretariat”.42 
In order to better identify in which situations committee secretariats may have a 
real impact on the EP’s reports, it is necessary to draw their main determinants of 
influence. The most significant factor is the level of expertise and involvement of the 
rapporteur: committee secretariats indeed tend to exert greater influence over the EP’s 
works when the rapporteur is ‘weak’, officials thereby acting almost as ‘substitutes’ to the 
MEP in charge of the dossier.43 In addition, the complexity of the files plays a key role on 
the capacity of officials to exert some influence. When a proposal is highly technical, 
rapporteurs usually tend to rely more upon the information and advice provided by 
committee secretariats. 44  Finally, inter-personal relations and individual attitudes of 
officials may also explain the more or less important influence committee secretariats can 
have. Good relationships between MEPs and officials indeed tend to make the 
secretariat’s voice better heard.45 Also, civil servants may have different perceptions of 
their own roles, thereby leading to more or less neutral behaviors.46 
If the LIBE secretariat can be expected to have played an influential role on the EP’s 
report about the GDPR proposal, because of the complexity and the length of the text, one 
might also expect these officials to be rather fundamental rights oriented. LIBE has indeed 
always been a very protective committee with regards to fundamental rights issues.47 This 
continuity and coherence might be explained by the ‘hidden’ work of the committee’s 
secretariat, acting towards this goal. 
As a result, the third hypothesis now to be challenged is the following: 
Hypothesis 3: Because of the complexity and length of the GDPR proposal, the LIBE 
secretariat has played a key role in assisting the rapporteur and in drafting the EP’s report, 
thereby making it more protective. 
42 Ibid., pp. 1377-1378. 
43 Mathias Dobbels and Christine Neuhold, ‘The roles bureaucrats play: The input of European 
Parliament administrators into the ordinary legislative procedure: A case study approach’, Journal of 
European Integration, vol. 35, no. 4, 2013, pp. 375–390, in Pegan, op. cit., p. 35. 
44 Olivier Costa, ‘Administrer le Parlement européen: Les paradoxes d’un secrétariat général 
incontournable, mais faible’, Politique européenne, vol.11, 2003, p.150. 
45Andreja Pegan, op. cit., p. 36. 
46 Olivier Costa, op. cit., p. 151. 
47 Camino Mortera-Martinez, op. cit. 
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The LIBE secretariat in the shadow of the rapporteur 
Based on the interviews I conducted, the LIBE secretariat actually seems to have 
been neutral and unbiased. The parliamentary assistant of MEP Sophia In’t’Veld, for 
instance, asserted that “of course, informally [LIBE officials] might have their opinion, but 
in the end, they are neutral”.48 The assistant of MEP Lauristin also shared this point of 
view about the secretariat.49 Actually, no interviewee has put the secretariat’s neutrality 
into question. 
Turning now to the evaluation of the secretariat’s influence over the EP’s position, 
there is also little evidence of any decisive impact. If LIBE officials seem to have been very 
actively involved in this dossier, they do not appear to have exerted significant influence 
over the content of the EP’s report. To put in other words, the LIBE secretariat has played a 
key role with regards to the first three functions identified by Pegan – technical-
administrative assistance, technical-substantive assistance and research – but a less 
important role in regard to the fourth one – political assistance. The main reason for that is 
the rapporteur’s active engagement. The parliamentary assistant of MEP Ernst, shadow 
rapporteur for the GDPR proposal, made it quite explicit: 
“Specifically with this dossier, the influence of the secretariat was lower than it is in 
other cases. (…) This is because the rapporteur's office took over many things and 
kept control of it”.50 
 
This was especially the case for the drafting of compromise amendments, where the 
secretariat typically can exert some influence, e.g. if rapporteurs ask officials to elaborate 
compromises. Here, in general, compromise amendments have been directly drafted by 
MEP Albrecht and his office.51 
The influence of the secretariat over the content of the EP’s report therefore seems 
to have been very limited. This finding is in line with the previous ones. Indeed, since it has 
been both argued that the rapporteur was very deeply involved in this dossier and that the 
influence of committee secretariats largely depended upon the rapporteur’s expertise and 
48 Interview with Thomas Van der Valk, op. cit. 
49 Interview with Eleni Chronopoulou, parliamentary assistant of MEP Marju Lauristin, Brussels, 13 
April 2015. 
50 Phone interview with Lorenz Krämer, parliamentary assistant of MEP Cornelia Ernst (Germany, 
GUE), shadow rapporteur for the GDPR proposal, 20 March 2015. 
51 Interviews with Thomas Van der Valk, op. cit. and with Lorenz Krämer, op. cit. 
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engagement, it is coherent – almost ‘automatic’ – to conclude that LIBE officials did not 
exert any significant influence over the EP’s position.  
So, to answer the third hypothesis, it can be said that the LIBE secretariat’s work is 
not a key factor in explaining the protective position of the European Parliament: it did not 
have much influence on the substance of the EP’s position, mainly due to the active role 
played by MEP Albrecht. 
After having examined several factors that may have influenced the EP’s position 
from the inside, it is now important to take into consideration external factors.  
 
2. Explaining the balance found within the European Parliament: the role of 
external factors 
Lobbying, and more particularly, the mobilization of civil society (3.1), as well as external 
events such as the ‘Snowden affair’ (3.2) may have influenced the EP’s position towards a 
greater protection of personal data. Also, new institutionalism theories may prove relevant 
to explain the EP’s position. The latter could be due to the Parliament’s will to assert itself 
as an institution and to act strategically, essentially towards the Council (3.3).  
 The lobbying hypothesis: the impact of citizens-oriented interest groups 
Taking into account the possible influence of lobbying activities over the EP’s 
position requires to look at the conditions under which citizens-oriented interest groups 
are more likely to impose their views over businesses. Scholars generally identify three 
main categories of determinants which can affect the lobbying influence over the 
outcomes: interest groups’ characteristics, issue-related factors and institutional 
components.52 Fitting into this general distinction, three more specific factors have been 
identified by Rasmussen in order to evaluate when business interests are likely to win over 
more diffuse interests in the European Parliament.53  
1) Interest groups’ characteristics: Business unity vs. fragmentation. 
This first condition is quite intuitive: businesses are more likely to influence the 
legislative outcome if they speak with one single voice, and conversely. 
52 Andreas Dür and Dirk de Bièvre, ‘The Question of Interest Group Influence’, Journal of Public Policy, 
vol. 27, no. 1, 2007, pp. 1-12. 
53 Maja Kluger Rasmussen, ‘The Battle for Influence: The Politics of Business Lobbying in the 
European Parliament’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 53, no. 2, pp. 365-382. 
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2) Issue-related factors: Low vs. high salience 
The salience of an issue refers to the attention it receives in general, but especially 
in the media and in public opinion. Rasmussen explains that the less salient and 
the more technical the issue is, the more influential business groups actually are.54  
3) Institutional features: ‘Mainstream’ vs. ‘less responsible’ committees 
Rasmussen found that “business groups are more likely to shape policy outcomes 
when dossiers are dealt with by mainstream committees”. 55  ‘Mainstream’ 
committees correspond to those which work mostly under the ordinary legislative 
procedure. While co-decision “encourages pragmatism and consensual behavior, 
consultation fosters confrontational behavior on part of the EP”.56 This explains 
why committees that are used to work under consultative procedures tend to be 
higher demanders in terms of protection of citizens.57  
Another important institutional feature of the Parliament is the rapporteurship 
system, which makes the lobbying influence also highly dependent on the attitudes 
of the rapporteur and the shadows. Furthermore, it is usually assumed that the EP 
as an institution generally tends to be more favorable to diffuse interests.58 
Several conditions for citizens groups’ influence seem to be met in this case study. First, 
the saliency of the issue is high, because of the great interest from all sides and from the 
media. Second, the LIBE committee is not a ‘mainstream’ committee, because it used to – 
and sometimes still does – work under consultative procedures.  
The fourth hypothesis that will now be examined is therefore the following: 
Hypothesis 4: Mainly because of the high issue saliency, citizens-oriented interest groups 
have exerted a key influence over the EP’s position, thereby explaining its ‘protective’ 
direction. 
54 Ibid., p. 369. See also Heike Klüver, Caelesta Braun & Jan Beyers, ‘Legislative lobbying in context: 
towards a conceptual framework of interest group lobbying in the European Union’, Journal of 
European Public Policy, vol. 22, no. 4, 2015, p. 450. 
55 Maja Kluger Rasmussen, op. cit., p. 378. 
56 Ibid., p. 370. 
57 Ibid., p. 378. 
58 Alasdair R. Young, ‘The Politics of Regulation and the Internal Market’, in Knud Erik Jorgensen, 
Mark A. Pollack & Ben Rosamond, Handbook of European Union Politics, SAGE Publications, 2006, p. 
382. 
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Citizens-oriented interest groups: an influence which has to be nuanced 
When looking at the empirical findings, there seems to be several elements 
confirming the conditions under which citizens-oriented groups can exert some influence 
over the outcome. First of all, the issue of data protection has been highly salient, 
especially after the ‘Snowden affair’ in 2013. It attracted the attention of a very high 
number of organizations, be they private or public. Mr. Van der Valk described this 
proposal as a “high-profile legislative file”, the very high number of amendments proving 
the importance and interest in this dossier.59 
Furthermore, there is some indication of a great involvement of citizens-oriented 
interest groups in this file, among which ‘European Digital Rights’ and the ‘European 
Consumer Organisation’ (BEUC).60 An official from the European Commission considered 
that there was a particular mobilization of the civil society on this issue.61 This view was 
shared by Mr. Van der Valk who said that “NGOs have been very powerful and organized, 
maybe more than ever, I don’t know, but they were very active on the file”.62 As a proof of 
the active involvement of these protection-oriented interest groups, both interviewees 
mentioned the ‘Lobbyplag’ initiative,63a website which compares all the amendments 
submitted by MEPs on the GDPR proposal to position papers from all the different 
organizations involved in order to increase transparency about lobbying impact. Such an 
initiative had never been undertaken before, thereby proving the very high interest from 
citizens-oriented groups in this file. 
Finally, this dossier was dealt with by the LIBE committee, which is far from being a 
‘mainstream’ committee. As previously mentioned, this committee was used to work under 
consultative procedures and it got the reputation of a defender of fundamental rights.  
If conditions of high saliency and of ‘non-mainstream’ committee therefore seem to 
be met, thereby allowing citizens’ groups to exert some influence, the third condition 
identified by Rasmussen is not met, that is, business fragmentation. On the contrary, 
industries have been quite united on this issue. This is very well illustrated by the email I 
received from a representative of this sector whom I contacted for an interview:  
59 Interview with an EP official, op. cit. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Interview with an official, DG Justice, European Commission, Brussels, 10 March 2015. 
62 Interview with Thomas Van der Valk, op. cit. 
63 ‘Lobbyplag’, retrieved 20 April 2015, http://lobbyplag.eu/. 
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“There is a very solid consensus among industry actors on the [GDPR], so our point 
of view would not be different from what you would hear from others”.64 
 
Besides their unity on the matter, industries have also been very active, thereby balancing 
the possible influence of citizens-oriented groups. Many interviewees underlined the very 
important mobilization of businesses and industries on this text.65 An EP official, for 
instance, estimated that “90% [of the amendments] came from the industrial sector”,66 a 
number on which the rapporteur Jan Phlipp Albrecht agreed.67 
It becomes therefore quite clear that both businesses and citizens-oriented interest 
groups have been very actively involved in this dossier. As a consequence, it is difficult to 
attribute the protective position of the EP to the lobbying activity of citizens groups alone. 
Hence, the ‘victory’ of citizens-oriented interest groups may be better explained by the role 
played by LIBE and by the rapporteur, both acting as ‘filters’. 
The parliamentary assistant of MEP Ernst e.g. explained that business influence in 
the LIBE committee was limited by the fact that MEPs always have to justify to the rest of 
the committee why they are introducing specific amendments to the proposal.68 This 
enables to filter potentially irrelevant amendments coming from all sides. Then, obviously, 
the fact that the EP’s report is rather protection-oriented has something to do with the 
rapporteur’s influence. MEP Axel Voss e.g. argued that the report from the Greens was 
much influenced by protection-oriented NGOs. 69  Thus, by ‘selecting’ and ‘filtering’ 
amendments, both the LIBE committee and the rapporteur have enabled citizens-oriented 
interests to be translated into the substance of the EP’s report. 
The fourth hypothesis may therefore be answered in the following way: the high 
saliency of the issue indeed made citizens-oriented interest groups quite influent over the 
EP’s position, however because the mobilization of industries was also very important, the 
protective position of the EP seems to be better explained by the role of the LIBE 
committee and of the rapporteur in this process – thereby validating previous findings. 
Lobbying in itself does not really help explaining why the EP did strike this particular 
balance. 
64 Email received from a representative of the digital industry sector, 29 March 2015. 
65 Interview with Eleni Chronopoulou, op. cit. 
66 Interview an EP official, op. cit. 
67 Interview with MEP Jan Philipp Albrecht, op. cit. 
68 Interview with Lorenz Krämer, op. cit. 
69 Interview with MEP Axel Voss, op. cit. 
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This finding must now be further detailed, notably through the analysis of the 
general context and public opinion because, “if [an interest] group takes a position that is 
also supported by public opinion, its influence over outcomes may appear larger than it 
actually is”.70 
The external events hypothesis: the consequences of the ‘Snowden affair’ 
External events may lead to a context more favorable to certain interests; in 
particular, they can increase the saliency of an issue, thereby advantaging diffuse 
interests over business’ ones. Indeed, “high public salience (…) may have the effect of 
deterring business lobbying”, because firms do not want to be seen as opposing 
consumers’ or citizens’ interests in the media.71 Several scholars have been studying the 
impacts external events may have on public opinion and on policy-making processes. The 
‘focusing events’ literature as well as the ‘Advocacy Coalitions Framework’ (ACF) are 
particularly relevant here. 
The role of ‘focusing events’ 
Both Birkland and Kingdon have been examining the role that ‘focusing events’ can 
play on public opinion and on the decision-making process. According to Birkland’s 
definition, a ‘focusing event’ is “an event that is sudden, relatively uncommon, can be 
reasonably defined as harmful (…) and that is known to policy makers and the public 
simultaneously”.72 Because these ‘focusing events’ call to the attention of many different 
actors (media, government, interest groups, citizens and so on), they tend to accelerate the 
search for a solution “in the wake of apparent policy failure”.73 Birkland notes that the 
increased attention can “further tilt the balance of debate in favor of pro-change groups”, 
as opposed to status-quo oriented groups, i.e. – in most cases – businesses.74 
Policy change in the ‘Advocacy Coalitions Framework’ 
The ‘Advocacy Coalitions Framework’ (ACF), initially developed by Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith in 1988, offers another interesting look at how beliefs and policies can 
70 Andreas Dür and Dirk de Bievre, op. cit., p. 7. 
71 Andreas Dür and Gemma Mateo, ‘Public opinion and interest group influence: how citizen groups 
derailed the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 21, no. 8, 
2014, p. 1204. 
72 Thomas A. Birkland, ‘Focusing Events, Mobilization, and Agenda-Setting’, Journal of Public Policy, 
vol. 18, no. 1, 1998, p. 54. 
73 Ibid., p. 55. 
74 Ibid. 
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change. According to the ACF, actors are strongly influenced by their vision of the world, 
i.e. by their beliefs – “deep core”, “policy core” and “secondary” beliefs.75 Because beliefs 
are expected to be quite stable,76 this model expects a strong path-dependency and is 
rather interested in long-term policy change, with the idea that change is unlikely to occur 
quickly. 
Interestingly, “external perturbations or shocks” are identified by the ACF as one of 
the reasons which can explain more rapid policy changes. Such external events are 
depicted as having the potential to affect advocacy coalitions and dominant beliefs. 
Sabatier and Weible consider that “external shocks can shift agendas, focus public 
attention, and attract the attention of key decision-making sovereigns”. 77 They can 
therefore foster belief and policy change. 
Hence, the potential for external events to impact public opinion and policy 
outcomes leads to the formulation of the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: External events, such as the 2013 Snowden revelations, have driven the 
debates about the GDPR towards a greater fundamental rights oriented dimension, 
thereby leading the EP to adopt a more protective position. 
The ‘Snowden affair’ and the stronger position of the European Parliament 
In June 2013, Edward Snowden, an American computer professional, revealed 
classified information to the press about a massive U.S. surveillance program led by the 
National Security Agency (NSA). These revelations were very controversial as they 
accused the U.S. of breaching into citizens’ privacy, because of the very large scope of the 
spying activities, notably on Europeans. 
Strikingly, when asked about recent events which might have changed the way of 
dealing with the data protection topic, six out of the nine interviewees immediately 
mentioned the ‘Snowden affair’,78 while two other interviewees only talked about the 
impacts of this affair once I mentioned it.79 These findings illustrate the overall importance 
these revelations have had over the data protection debates. The ‘Snowden affair’ can be 
75 Paul Sabatier and Christopher M. Weible, ‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Innovations and 
Clarifications’, in Paul Sabatier (ed.), Theories of the Policy Process, Boulder, Westview Press, 2007, 
2nd edition, pp. 194-196. 
76 Ibid., p. 196. 
77 Ibid., p. 198. 
78 Interviews with Axel Voss, Jan Philipp Albrecht, Thomas Van der Valk, the representative of the 
industry sector, as well as the EP and the European Commission officials, op. cit. 
79 Interviews with Eleni Chronopoulou and Lorenz Krämer, op. cit. 
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labeled as a ‘focusing event’, since it was sudden, relatively uncommon and perceived as 
harmful to the privacy of European citizens. The interviews I conducted also confirm the 
great impact this affair has had on public opinion and beliefs, MEP Albrecht e.g. 
recognizing that “the Snowden revelations were a very important pick of awareness”.80 
As the ‘Snowden affair’ raised awareness in public debates and opinion about the 
need for a stronger protection of citizens’ data, this seems to have, in turn, facilitated the 
adoption of the EP’s report on the GDPR proposal. This external event has pushed hesitant 
political groups to vote in favor of Albrecht’s report, thereby making the EP’s position 
‘stronger’.81 This can be explained by the fact that political groups which were first 
hesitant did not want to appear as opposing citizens’ interests after this ‘focusing event’. 
This event however did not have “any real effect” on the actual content of the 
report.82 Indeed, one can hardly argue that the ‘Snowden affair’ has made the EP’s text 
more ‘protective’, for two main reasons. First, when the ‘Snowden affair’ broke out in June 
2013, the Parliament’s report was already well advanced.83 Second, the object of the GDPR 
proposal has no direct link with the NSA scandal, since the scope of the regulation does 
not cover activities of intelligence services.84 Nevertheless, this scandal did have minor 
impacts: several interviewees explained that, after this event, the chapter relating to 
transfers to third countries was modified, notably the compromise on Article 43a 
(‘Transfers or disclosures not authorized by Union law’).85 This was however the only 
concrete example which has been mentioned as a consequence of the ‘Snowden affair’. 
As a result, it can be concluded that the ‘Snowden affair’ did make the EP’s position 
‘stronger’, by facilitating its quick adoption with a very large majority, but not really more 
‘protective’, because this external event did not have significant impacts on the report’s 
content. 
The fact that the European Parliament itself took advantage of the ‘Snowden affair’ to raise 
its concerns, through the creation of an inquiry committee in July 2013, tends to illustrate 
the ‘natural’ tendency of this institution to act as a defender of fundamental rights. Hence, 
an explanation for the EP’s protective position might lie in its behavior as an institution.  
80 Interview with MEP Jan Philipp Albrecht, op. cit. 
81 Interviews with an EP official, op.cit., and with Eleni Chronopoulou, op. cit. 
82 Interview with Lorenz Krämer, op. cit. 
83 Interview with an EP official, op. cit. 
84 Interview with MEP Axel Voss, op. cit. 
85 Interviews with MEP Axel Voss, Thomas Van der Valk and a European Commission official, op. cit. 
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The new institutionalist hypothesis: a historical and strategic position for the European 
Parliament 
New institutionalist scholars argue that institutions shape behavior and 
preferences of actors, and in the end, have an influence over the decision-making. 
Institutionalism is considered here as an ‘external’ explanation in the sense that it is not 
directly linked to the internal organization of the Parliament as such. It has however both an 
internal and external dimension: actors’ preferences are expected to be influenced both by 
rules and norms specific to the institution (internal dimension) and by the behavior of the 
other institutions (external dimension). This last theoretical perspective therefore implies 
a broader scope of explanation regarding the EP’s position. 
New institutionalism is actually composed of several ‘sub-theories’. 86 Among 
those, Historical Institutionalism (HI) and Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI) are 
particularly relevant for the present case study. The key argument of HI scholars is that 
past events do matter. They argue that the legacy of the past within an institution 
constrains and shapes present and future choices.87 This refers to the concept of ‘path 
dependency’.88 The fact that previous actions influence the way actors behave therefore 
tends to provide for some continuity within the institutions; choices are expected to be 
coherent over time. 
According to RCI scholars, actors seek to maximize their interests, taking into 
account the institutional setting. Here, it is assumed that institutions allow individuals to 
meet their own aims, thereby implying that actors make an “instrumental use” of the 
institutions. 89  The concept of ‘interest maximization’ corresponds to the idea that 
individuals seek to get the biggest benefits within a given institutional environment.90 In 
this view, interaction with the other institutions does matter too: individuals make choices 
depending on the likely behaviour of the other institutions. Hence, their strategies are 
influenced by the inter-institutional setting. 
86 Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, ‘La science politique et les trois néo-institutionnalismes’, 
Revue française de science politique, vol. 47, no. 3-4, 1997, p. 469. 
87 Ibid., p. 475. 
88 Alex Warleigh, ‘Institutions, institutionalism and decision-making in the EU’, in Alex Warleigh (ed.), 
Understanding European Union Institutions, London, Routledge, 2002, p. 7. 
89 Ibid., p. 8. 
90 Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, op. cit., p. 479. 
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 Hypothesis 6: The previous actions of the European Parliament in the data 
protection field, as well as its will to differentiate itself from the Council as an institution, 
have strongly incited the EP to adopt a protective position on the GDPR proposal. 
More data protection: a coherent position of the European Parliament over time 
In line with HI insights, there is a wealth of evidence that the EP has been 
advocating for more data protection for a long time. The Parliament as a whole has the 
reputation of being the EU institution the most inclined to defend fundamental rights in 
general, through the use of a variety of means.91 In particular, data protection seems to be 
the area where the Parliament has been the most cohesive over time,92 thereby confirming 
the concept of ‘path-dependency’. 
There are many examples which tend to validate the idea that the EP has ‘always’ 
acted towards a greater protection of personal data. For instance, between 1975 and 1982, 
the Parliament already adopted four resolutions calling for an EU intervention in the area 
of data protection, in order to avoid gaps between Member States’ legislations and to 
enhance the protection of citizens’ personal data.93 Another example is its 2001 resolution 
on the ‘ECHELON’ surveillance program94following revelations about a global surveillance 
network; the final text was very critical in regards to the respect of proportionality and 
privacy. Another significant example is the EP’s rejection of the ‘SWIFT’ agreement in 2010 
(an agreement between the EU and the US aiming at facilitating transfers of financial data 
in order to better fight terrorism),95 on the grounds that safeguards for data protection 
were not sufficient.96 It was the first time that the EP rejected an international agreement. 
91 Florence Benoît-Rohmer, ‘The European Parliament affirms the values of the European Union’ in 
Yves Mény (dir.), Building Parliament. 50 years of European Parliament History 1958-2008, Luxembourg, 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2009, p. 228. 
92 Ariadna Ripoll-Servent, ‘Playing the co-decision game: is the European Parliament striking a 
balance between liberty and security?’, UACES Annual Conference, Angers, 3-6 September, 2009, p. 
6, in Camino Mortera-Martinez, op. cit., p. 23. 
93 Gloria Gonzalez Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection As a Fundamental Right of the 
EU, Brussels, Springer, ‘Law, Governance and Technology Series’, Vol. 16, 2014, pp. 113-118. 
94 European Parliament, Resolution of 5 September 2001 on the existence of a global system for the 
interception of private and commercial communications (Echelon interception system), OJ C72/45, 
2002. 
95 European Parliament, Resolution of 11 February 2010 on the proposal for a Council decision on the 
conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the 
processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for 
purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, OJ CE 341/100, 2010. 
96 Camino Mortera-Martinez, op. cit., p. 35. 
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As a result, these past events may have incited – if not constrained – the EP to 
adopt a coherent position regarding the GDPR proposal, i.e. to strengthen the protection of 
personal data. ‘Path dependency’ has framed the Parliament’s preferences and choices on 
the issue. 
Defending citizens’ interests: a strategic choice for the European Parliament 
In line now with RCI insights, the EP’s protective position may also be explained by 
the fact that adopting such a position was in the MEPs’ interests. As MEPs usually seek 
re-election, appearing as the ones defending the citizens’ interests and fundamental rights 
may serve their own interests. This is indeed expected to increase their legitimacy. 
Illustrating the willingness of MEPs to appear as the defenders of the citizens’ interests, 
MEP Axel Voss e.g. stated that “people should keep in mind that [the] Parliament is here to 
strengthen the rights of individuals”.97 
This can also be a strategic approach for the EP, i.e. a way to differentiate itself 
from the Council. Several elements in the interviews I conducted tend to validate this. A 
representative from the industry sector e.g. considered that the EP adopted its position 
quite quickly in order “to put a little bit [of] pressure on the Council”.98 This reflects the idea 
that the Parliament, as an institution, aimed at differentiating itself from the Council, so as 
to appear as the defender of European citizens’ interests.  
Hence, both historical (path dependency) and strategic (legitimacy gains) 
considerations have encouraged the Parliament to adopt a protective position regarding 
the GDPR proposal. New institutionalism theories therefore provide a comprehensive 
explanation for the EP’s preference for a greater protection of personal data. 
 
Conclusion 
Throughout this thesis, several hypotheses have been tested to explain why the 
Parliament did achieve a protective position concerning this reform. Many of them have 
proved to be valid, but, in line with the ‘competitive testing’ approach, it is now time to sort 
them out in order to identify which of those best explain the EP’s position.  
97 Julie Levy-Abegnoli, ‘‘The world cannot wait’ for EU to reach data protection agreement’, The 
Parliament Magazine, 2015, retrieved 3 May 2015, https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/articles/ 
news/world-cannot-wait-eu-reach-data-protection-agreement. 
98 Interview with a representative from the digital industry sector, op. cit. 
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If they had to be ranked from most to least influential, the new institutionalist 
hypothesis might come first. Indeed, since the EP has ‘always’ been pro-active in the 
protection of personal data, the impact of the institution itself on the MEPs’ preference 
seems quite significant. The past actions of the institution in this field have incited MEPs 
to keep a coherent position – through the concept of ‘path-dependency’. Also, the pursuing 
of legitimacy gains can be a powerful explanation for the MEPs’ protective stand.  
When going further into details, socio-organizational and individuals hypotheses 
appear to be particularly relevant as well. There is a wide recognition about the impact that 
the LIBE committee has had over the EP’s position in the end: it seems very unlikely that 
the Parliament would have reached such a protective text if another committee were to be 
in charge of the GDPR proposal. Such an achievement was also the result of the 
rapporteur’s influence. Jan Philipp Albrecht’s expertise and active involvement in this 
dossier enabled him to lead the discussions in the Parliament and to orientate the EP’s 
position towards a greater protection of personal data. 
Then, other factors have also influenced the EP’s position, but to a lesser extent. 
Lobbying and external events have proved to be important factors in the adoption of the 
EP’s report, but not decisive elements in explaining the ‘balance’ struck within the EP 
between fundamental rights and economic needs. Regarding the lobbying hypothesis, it 
has been shown that the protective position of the Parliament cannot be explained by the 
mobilization of citizens-oriented interest groups alone, since businesses have also been 
very active when trying to influence MEPs. Concerning the external events hypothesis, 
although empirical findings showed that the Snowden revelations did impact the debates 
and public perception on the data protection issue, there is little evidence that this affair 
did have a significant impact on the actual content of the EP’s report. Even if the ‘Snowden 
affair’ facilitated the adoption of Albrecht’s report with a large majority, one can therefore 
hardly argue that this event best explains the ‘protective’ balance that the Parliament 
managed to strike during its first reading. 
Finally, the factor which might be depicted as the least influential one when trying 
to explain the EP’s protective position refers to the administrative hypothesis. The very 
active involvement of the rapporteur gave very little leeway to LIBE secretariat officials for 
orientating the drafting of the EP’s report. In addition to that, there is no clear evidence of 
strong preferences from the LIBE secretariat, most interviewees acknowledging the 
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officials’ neutrality in the process. The work of LIBE officials therefore does not appear as 
a decisive factor to explain the EP’s protective stand. 
Hence, the protective position of the European Parliament is best explained by a 
combination of various factors, the main ones being the influence of the lead committee 
and of the rapporteur, as well as the institutional dimension of MEPs’ preferences.  
Obviously, there is room for further research on this topic, in particular with regards 
to the analysis of the other EU institutions’ positions or to the similar discussions on the 
‘Police Directive’99. In any case, debates about data protection are far from over. Actually, 
for better or worse, this decisive issue is promised to an agitated destiny, marked by the 
constant pursuing of a difficult trade-off between privacy rights and economic – or 
security – needs. 
99 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the 
purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of 
criminal penalties, and the free movement of such data, COM(2012)10 final, Brussels, 25 January 
2012. 
 30 
                                                 
Bibliography 
Benedetto, Giacomo, ‘Rapporteurs as Legislative Entrepreneurs: the Dynamics of the 
Codecision Procedure in Europe’s Parliament’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 
12, no. 1, 2005, pp. 67-88. 
Birkland, Thomas A., ‘Focusing Events, Mobilization, and Agenda-Setting’, Journal of Public 
Policy, vol. 18, no. 1, 1998, pp. 53-74. 
Bowler, Shaun and David M. Farrell, ‘The Organizing of the European Parliament: 
Committees, Specialization and Coordination’, British Journal of Political Science, 
vol. 25, no. 2, 1995, pp. 219-243. 
Burns, Charlotte, ‘Co-decision and Inter-Committee Conflict in the European Parliament 
post-Amsterdam’, Government and Opposition, vol. 41, no. 2, 2006, pp. 230-248. 
 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Official Journal of the European 
Union, C326, 26 October 2012, pp. 391-407. 
Chee, Foo Yun, ‘European Court says Google must respect ‘right to be forgotten’’, Reuters, 
2014, retrieved 20 April 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/13/us-eu-
google-dataprotection-idUSBREA4C07120140513. 
Corbett, Richard, Francis Jacobs & Michael Shackleton, The European Parliament, London, 
John Harper Publishing, 2011, 8th edition. 
Costa, Olivier, ‘Administrer le Parlement européen: Les paradoxes d’un secrétariat général 
incontournable, mais faible’, Politique européenne, vol. 11, 2003, pp. 143–161. 
Costa, Olivier, Le Parlement européen, assemblée délibérante, Bruxelles, Editions de 
l’Université de Bruxelles, 2001. 
Costello, Rory, and Robert Thomson, ‘The Nexus of bicameralism: Rapporteurs’ impact on 
decision outcomes in the European Union’, European Union Politics, vol. 12, no. 3, 
2011, pp. 337-357. 
Costello, Rory, and Robert Thomson, ‘The Policy Impact of Leadership in Committees: 
Rapporteurs’ influence on the European Parliament’s opinions’, European Union 
Politics, vol. 11, no. 2, 2010, pp. 219-240. 
Coudray, Ludovic, La protection des données personnelles dans l’Union européenne, Naissance 
et consécration d’un droit fondamental, Leipzig, Editions universitaires européennes, 
2010. 
Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data, CETS no.108, Strasbourg, 28 January 1980. 
Council of the European Union, ‘Inter-institutional file: 2012/0011 (COD)’, Document 
no.13772/14, Brussels, 3 October 2014. 
Council of the European Union, ‘Inter-institutional file: 2012/0011 (COD)’, Document 
no.15395/14, Brussels, 19 December 2014. 
Council of the European Union, ‘Inter-institutional file: 2012/0011 (COD)’, Document 
no.11028/14, Brussels, 30 June 2014. 
Council of the European Union, ‘Inter-institutional file: 2012/0011 (COD)’, Document 
no.15656/14, Brussels, 25 November 2014. 
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data, Official Journal of the European Union, L281, 23 
November 1995, pp. 31-50. 
 31 
Dür, Andreas and Gemma Mateo, ‘Public opinion and interest group influence: how citizen 
groups derailed the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement’, Journal of European 
Public Policy, vol. 21, no. 8, 2014, pp. 1199-1217. 
Dür, Andreas, and Dirk De Bièvre, ‘The Question of Interest Group Influence’, Journal of 
Public Policy, vol. 27, no. 1, 2007, pp. 1-12. 
Dür, Andreas, Patrick Bernhagen & David Marshall, ‘Interest group success in the European 
Union: When (and why) does business lose?’, Comparative Political Studies, 2015 
(forthcoming). 
Essers, Loek, EU data protection reform ‘badly broken’, civil groups warn, PC World, 2015, 
retrieved 14 April 2015, http://www.pcworld.com/article/2892172/eu-data-
protection-reform-badly-broken-civil-liberty-groups-warn.html. 
Eudes, Yves, ‘Bataille autour des données des passagers d’avions européens’, Le Monde, 
2015, retrieved 26 January 2015, http://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2015/01/ 
26/bataille-autour-des-donnees-des-passagers-d-avions-europeens_4563294_ 
4408996.html. 
European Commission, Data protection reform: Frequently asked questions, MEMO/12/41, 
Brussels, 25 January 2012. 
European Commission, Press Release, Commission proposes a comprehensive reform of 
data protection rules to increase users' control of their data and to cut costs for 
businesses, IP 12/46, Brussels, 25 January 2012. 
European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the protection of 
individuals in relation to the processing of personal data, COM(1990)314 final, 
Brussels, 18 July 1990.  
European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by 
competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or 
prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the free 
movement of such data, COM(2012)10 final, Brussels, 25 January 2012. 
European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), 
COM(2012)11 final, Brussels, 25 January 2012. 
European Court of Justice, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), joined cases C-293/12 
and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland, 8 April 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238. 
European Court of Justice, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), case C-131/12, Google 
Spain and Google, 13 May 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317. 
European Parliament TV Studio, Live Panel Debate: ‘Can the next EU regulation guarantee 
data protection for all?’, 2015, retrieved 20 January 2015, http://www.vieuws.eu/live-
panel-debate/debate-can-the-next-eu-regulation-guarantee-data-protection-for-all/. 
European Parliament, ‘04.12.2014 Debate in Council’, Summary, retrieved 16 April 2015, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/summary.do?id=1369996&t=e&l=en. 
European Parliament, ‘25.10.2012 Debate in Council’, Summary, retrieved 16 April 2015, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/summary.do?id=1232253&t=e&l=en. 
European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs, Towards a new EU Legal Framework for Data Protection and Privacy – 
Challenges, Principles and the Role of the European Parliament, PE 453.216, Brussels, 
2011.  
 32 
European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs, Fighting cyber crime and protecting privacy in the cloud , PE 462.509, 
Brussels, 2012.  
European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs, Protection of Personal Data in Work-related Relations, PE 474.440, 
Brussels, 2013.  
European Parliament, Internal Rules of Procedure, 8th parliamentary term, July 2014. 
European Parliament, Legislative resolution of 12 March 2014 on the proposal for a regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement on such data 
(General Data Protection Regulation), P7_TA(2014)0212, Strasbourg, 12 March 2014. 
European Parliament, Resolution of 11 February 2010 on the proposal for a Council decision 
on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the United States 
of America on the processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the 
European Union to the United States for purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking 
Program, OJ CE 341/100, 2010. 
European Parliament, Resolution of 17 December 1998 on respect for human rights in the 
European Union, OJ C98/42, 1999. 
European Parliament, Resolution of 5 September 2001 on the existence of a global system for 
the interception of private and commercial communications (Echelon interception 
system), OJ C72/45, 2002. 
European Parliament, Resolution of the European Parliament of 8 April 1976 on the protection 
of the right of the individual in the face of developing technical progress in the field of 
automatic data processing, OJ C100/27, 1976. 
European Parliament, Resolution of the European Parliament of 9 March 1982 on the 
protection of the rights of the individual in the face of technical developments in data 
processing, OJ C87/39, 1982. 
European Parliament, Resolution of the European Parliament on the protection of the rights of 
the individual in the face of technical developments in data processing, OJ C140/34, 
1979. 
European Parliament, Resolution of the European Parliament on the protection of the rights of 
the individual in the face of developing technical progress in the field of automatic data 
processing, OJ C60/48, 1975. 
Fleming, Jeremy, ‘Parliament resists pressure on passenger data ahead of EU Summit’, 
Euractiv, 2015, retrieved 10 February 2015, http://www.euractiv.com/sections/ 
infosociety/parliament-resists-pressure-passenger-data-ahead-eu-summit-311939. 
Gonzalez Fuster, Gloria, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection As a Fundamental Right 
of the EU, Brussels, Springer, ‘Law, Governance and Technology Series’, vol. 16, 
2014. 
Hall, Peter A. and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, ‘La science politique et les trois néo-
institutionnalismes’, Revue française de science politique, vol. 47, no. 3-4, 1997, pp. 
469-496. 
Hausemer, Pierre, ‘Participation and Political Competition in Committee Report Allocation’, 
European Union Politics, vol. 7, no. 4, 2006, pp. 505-530. 
Hermansen, Silje S. L., Report Allocation in the European Parliament: Selection Criteria of Key-
Legislators in EU’s Directly Elected Assembly, Master Thesis in Political Science from 
the University of Oslo, 2010. 
 33 
Hix, Simon, Tapio Raunio & Roger Scully, ‘An institutional theory of behavior in the 
European Parliament’, European Parliament Research Group, working paper no. 1, 
London, London School of Economics, 1999. 
Judge, David and David Earnshaw, The European Parliament, Basingstoke, Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2008, 2nd edition. 
Jupille, Joseph, James A. Caporaso & Jeffrey T. Checkel, ‘Integrating Institutions: 
Rationalism, Constructivism, and the Study of the European Union’, Comparative 
Political Studies, vol. 36, no. 1-2, 2003, pp. 7-40.  
Kaeding, Michael, ‘Rapporteurship Allocation in the European Parliament: Information or 
Distribution?’, European Union Politics, vol. 5, no. 3, 2004, pp. 353-371. 
Kaeding, Michael, ‘The world of committee reports: rapporteurship assignment in the 
European Parliament’, The Journal of Legislative Studies, vol. 11, no. 1, 2005, pp. 82-
104. 
Katznelson, Ira and Barry R. Weingast, ‘Intersections Between Historical and Rational 
Choice Institutionalism’, in Ira Katznelson and Barry R. Weingast (eds.), Preferences 
and Situations: Points of Intersection Between Historical and Rational Choice 
Institutionalism, New York, Russell Sage Foundation Publications, 2007, pp. 1-24. 
Kingdon, John W., Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, New York, Longman, 2003, 2nd 
edition. 
Klüver, Heike, Caelesta Braun & Jan Beyers, ‘Legislative lobbying in context: towards a 
conceptual framework of interest group lobbying in the European Union’, Journal of 
European Public Policy, vol. 22, no. 4, 2015, pp. 447-461. 
Kreppel, Amie and George Tsebelis, ‘Coalition Formation in the European Parliament’, 
Comparative Political Studies, vol. 32, no. 8, 1999, pp. 933-966. 
Kreppel, Amie, ‘Moving Beyond Procedure: An Empirical Analysis of European Parliament 
Legislative Influence’, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 35, no.7, 2002, pp.784-813. 
Kreppel, Amie, ‘Rules, ideology and coalition formation in the European parliament’, 
European Union Politics, vol. 1, no. 3, 2000, pp. 340-362. 
Levy-Abegnoli, Julie, ‘‘The world cannot wait’ for EU to reach data protection agreement’, 
The Parliament Magazine, 2015, retrieved 19 April 2015, 
https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/articles/news/world-cannot-wait-eu-
reach-data-protection-agreement. 
Levy-Abegnoli, Julie, ‘No EU data protection deal ‘before end of year’’, The Parliament 
Magazine, 2015, retrieved 19 April 2015, https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/ 
articles/news/no-eu-data-protection-deal-end-year. 
Lowndes, Vivien, ‘Institutionalism’, in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (eds.), Theory and 
Methods in Political Science, Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2002, 2nd edition, pp. 
90-108. 
Mamadouh, Virginie and Tapio Raunio, ‘The Committee System: Powers, Appointments 
and Report Allocation’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 41, no. 2, 2003, pp. 
333-351. 
Marshall, David, ‘Do rapporteurs receive independent expert policy advice? Indirect 
lobbying via the European Parliament’s committee secretariat’, Journal of European 
Public Policy, vol. 19, no. 9, 2012, pp. 1377-1395. 
Marshall, David, ‘Who to lobby and when: Institutional determinants of interest group 
strategies in European Parliament committees’, European Union Politics, vol. 11, no. 
4, 2010, pp. 553-575. 
Mény, Yves (dir.), Building Parliament. 50 years of European Parliament History 1958-2008, 
Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2009. 
 34 
Michel, Anne-Sophie, Le Parlement européen en tant qu'acteur social de l'Union européenne – 
A travers le cas de la commission Emploi Affaires Sociales, étude des déterminants et 
moyens d’action du Parlement, Mémoire du Collège d'Europe, 2009-2010. 
Mortera-Martinez, Camino, Deconstructing Robin Hood: SWIFT, a test case for the European 
Parliament’s fight for liberty?, Thesis from the College of Europe, 2010-2011. 
Naranjo, Diego, Leaked documents: European data protection reform is badly broken, 
European Digital Rights, 2015, retrieved 19 April 2015, http://edri.org/broken_badly. 
Neuhold, Christine and Elissaveta Radulova, ‘The involvement of administrative players in 
the EU decision-making process’, in Herwig C.H. Hofmann and Alexander H. Türk 
(eds.), EU Administrative Governance, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006, 
pp. 44-73. 
Neuhold, Christine and Pierpaolo Settembri, ‘The role of European Parliament committees 
in the EU policy-making’, in Thomas Christiansen and Torbjörn Larsson (eds.), The 
Role of Committees in the Policy-Process of the European Union: Legislation, 
Implementation and Deliberation, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publisher, 2007, pp. 152-
182. 
Neuhold, Christine, ‘The “Legislative Backbone” keeping the Institution upright? The Role 
of European Parliament Committees in the EU Policy-Making Process’, European 
Integration online Papers (EIoP), vol. 5, no. 10, 2001. 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD Guidelines on the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, C(80)58/final, 23 
September 1980. 
Panichi, James, ‘Ministers sign up for controversial one-stop-shop for data protection’, 
European Voice, 13 March 2015, retrieved 19 April 2015, 
http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/ministers-sign-up-for-one-stop-shop-for-
data-protection/. 
Pegan, Andreja, An Analysis of Legislative Assistance in the European Parliament, Doctorate 
from the University of Luxembourg, presented on 27 March 2015 in Luxembourg. 
Peters, Guy B. Institutional Theory in Political Science: the ‘New Institutionalism’, London, 
Continuum, 1999. 
Priestley, Julian, ‘L’administration du Parlement européen au service des députés’, Revue 
française d’Administration Publique, vol. 95, 2000, pp. 439-451. 
Rasmussen, Maja Kluger, ‘The Battle for Influence: The Politics of Business Lobbying in 
the European Parliament’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.53, no.2, pp.365-
382. 
Ringe, Nils, Who Decides, and How? Preferences, Uncertainty, and Policy Choice in the 
European Parliament, New York, Oxford University Press, 2010. 
Ripoll Servent, Ariadna and Florian Trauner (eds.), Policy Change in the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice: How EU Institutions Matter, London, Routledge, 2015. 
Roger, Léa and Thomas Winzen, ‘Party groups and committee negotiations in the 
European Parliament: outside attention and the anticipation of plenary conflict’, 
Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 22, no. 3, 2015, pp. 391-408. 
Sabatier, Paul A. and Christopher M. Weible, ‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework: 
Innovations and Clarifications’, in Paul Sabatier (ed.), Theories of the Policy Process, 
Boulder, Westview Press, 2007, 2nd edition, pp. 189-222. 
Sabatier, Paul, ‘The advocacy coalition framework: revisions and relevance for Europe’, 
Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 5, no. 1, 1998, pp. 98-130. 
Schwartz, Paul M., ‘Property, Privacy, and Personal Data’, Harvard Law Review, vol. 117, no. 
7, 2004, pp. 2056-2128. 
 35 
Taylor, Simon, ‘EU data protection supervisor calls for rapid deal on reform’, European 
Voice, 2015, retrieved 5 April 2015, http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/eu-data-
protection-supervisor-calls-for-rapid-deal-on-reform/  
United Nations, General Assembly, Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal 
Data Files, Resolution 45/95, 14 December 1990. 
Warleigh, Alex, ‘Institutions, institutionalism and decision-making in the EU’, in Alex 
Warleigh (ed.), Understanding European Union Institutions, London, Routledge, 2002, 
pp. 1-22. 
Yordanova, Nikoleta, ‘Inter-institutional Rules and Division of Power in the European 
Parliament: Allocation of Consultation and Co-decision Reports’, West European 
Politics, vol. 34, no. 1, 2011, pp. 97-121. 
Yordanova, Nikoleta, ‘The Rationale Behind Committee Assignment in the European 
Parliament: Distributive, Informational and Partisan Perspectives’, European Union 
Politics, vol. 10, no. 2, 2009, pp. 253-280. 
Yordanova, Nikoleta, Organising the European Parliament: The Role of Committees and their 
Legislative Influence, Colchester, ECPR Press, 2013. 
Young, Alasdair R., ‘The Politics of Regulation and the Internal Market’, in Knud Erik 
Jorgensen, Mark A. Pollack & Ben Rosamond, Handbook of European Union Politics, 
SAGE Publications, 2006, pp. 373-390. 
 
 
  
 36 
Interviews 
Interview with an official, DG Justice, European Commission, Brussels, 10 March 2015. 
Interview with an official, LIBE secretariat, European Parliament, Brussels, 25 March 2015. 
Interview with Axel Voss, MEP (Germany, EPP), shadow rapporteur for the GDPR proposal, 
Strasbourg, 11 February 2015. 
Interview with Jan Philipp Albrecht, MEP (Germany, Greens), rapporteur for the GDPR 
proposal, Strasbourg, 11 February 2015. 
Interview with Marju Lauristin, MEP (Estonia, S&D), shadow rapporteur for the GDPR 
proposal, and Eleni Chronopoulou, her parliamentary assistant, Brussels, 13 April 
2015. 
Phone interview with a representative from the digital industry sector, 17 April 2015. 
Phone interview with Lorenz Krämer, parliamentary assistant of MEP Cornelia Ernst 
(Germany, GUE), shadow rapporteur for the GDPR proposal, 20 March 2015. 
Phone interview with Thomas Van der Valk, parliamentary assistant of MEP Sophia 
In’t’Veld (Netherlands, ALDE), shadow rapporteur for the GDPR proposal, 21 April 
2015. 
Written interview with Joe McNamee, Executive Director of EDRi (European Digital Rights), 
3 March 2015. 
 
  
 37 
Bruges Political Research Papers / Cahiers de recherche politique de Bruges 
 
No 46 / 2015 
Pablo Gómez Leahy, The Interregional Association Agreement between the European 
Union and Mercosur: Is the Timing Right? 
No 45 / 2015 
Doina Pinzari, EU democratization policies in the Neighbourhood countries and Russia’s 
reaction as a destabilizing factor: A comparative case study of Georgia and Moldova 
No 44 / 2015 
Lorenzo Donatelli, A Pan-European District for the European Elections? The Rise and Fall 
of the Duff Proposal for the Electoral Reform of the European Parliament 
No 43 / 2015 
Marta Pabian, La place des émotions dans les campagnes du Front national et du 
Mouvement démocrate pour les élections européennes de 2014 
No 42 / 2015 
Martina Barbero, L’Européanisation des politiques d’innovation en France: une révolution 
copernicienne? Le cas de la région Rhône-Alpes 
No 41 / 2015 
Ferdi De Ville and Dieter Berckvens, What do Eurozone academics think about EMU 
reform? On broad support and German exceptionalism 
No 40 / 2015 
Emilie Cazenave, Eurodéputé : « Seconde chance » ou « Tremplin » - Comparaisons des 
trajectoires politiques de candidats PSE et PPE aux élections européennes de 2014 en 
France et en Suède 
No 39/ 2015 
Nathalie Brack, Olivier Costa et Clarissa Dri, Le Parlement européen à la recherche de 
l’efficacité législative : Une analyse des évolutions de son organisation  
No 38 /2014 
Stefaan De Rynck, Changing Banking Supervision in the Eurozone: the ECB as a Policy 
Entrepreneur 
No 37 / 2014 
Pierre Vanheuverzwijn, Promoting the agenda for a social Economic and Monetary Union: 
Attention, credibility and coalition-building 
No 36 / 2014 
Aileen Körfer, Politicising the Union? The Influence of ‘Leading Candidates’ for the 
Commission Presidency 
 
 
 38 
No 35 / 2014 
Guillaume Meynet, Analyser l’influence du syndicalisme agricole majoritaire: quelle utilité 
pour le modèle néo-corporatiste? Etude de cas à partir du «mini-paquet lait» 
No 34 / 2014 
Laurent Bonfond, Le Parlement européen et les actes délégués: De la conquête d’un 
pouvoir à son exercice 
No 33 / 2014 
Alexis Perier, Le quatrième paquet ferroviaire: l’impossible libéralisation?  
No 32 / 2013 
Eguzki Osteikoetxea, EU Trade Actors after Lisbon: Enhanced Negotiations or Business as 
Usual? 
No 31 / 2013 
David Freed, Do Institutional Changes Make a Difference? A Veto Player Analysis of how 
Institutional Changes in the Council of the EU Influence Legislative Efficiency and Outputs 
No 30 / 2013 
Camille Dehestru, Industries and Citizens’ Groups Networks in EU Food Policy: The 
Emergence of ‘Unholy Alliances’ in Multilevel Governance? 
No 29 / 2013 
Carole Pouliquen, Le cadre européen de protection des données personnelles en matière 
pénale: Dimensions interne et externe  
No 28 / 2013 
Marta Zalewska and Oskar Josef Gstrein, National Parliaments and their Role in European 
Integration: The EU’s Democratic Deficit in Times of Economic Hardship and Political 
Insecurity 
No 27 / 2012 
Laura Batalla Adam, The Significance of EU Topics in National Media: Has There Been a 
Europeanization of Reporting in the National Media? 
No 26 / 2012 
Claire Baffert, Participatory Approaches In The Management Of Natura 2000: When EU 
Biodiversity Policy Gets Closer to its Citizens 
No 25 / 2012 
Serena Garelli, The European Union’s Promotion of Regional Economic Integration in 
Southeast Asia: Norms, Markets or Both? 
No 24 / 2012 
Luis Bouza García, Víctor Cuesta López, Elitsa Mincheva and Dorota Szeligowska, The 
European Citizens’ Initiative – A First Assessment 
No 23 / 2012 
Isabelle de Lichtervelde, La défense des droits de l’homme en Chine: Le parlement 
européen est-il la voix normative de l’union européenne?  
 39 
No 22 / 2012 
Erik Brattberg and Mark Rhinard, The EU and US as International Actors in Disaster Relief 
No 21 / 2011 
Alesia Koush, Fight against the Illegal Antiquities Traffic in the EU: Bridging the Legislative 
Gaps 
No 20 / 2011 
Neill Nugent and Laurie Buonanno, Explaining the EU’s Policy Portfolio: Applying a Federal 
Integration Approach to EU Codecision Policy 
No 19 / 2011 
Frederika Cruce, How Did We End Up with This Deal? Examining the Role of Environmental 
NGOs in EU Climate Policymaking 
No 18 / 2011 
Didier Reynders, Vers une nouvelle ‘gouvernance économique’? 
No 17 / 2010 
Violeta Podagėlytė, Democracy beyond the Rhetoric and the Emergence of the “EU Prince”: 
The Case of EU-Ukraine Relations 
No 16 / 2010 
Maroš Šefčovič, From Institutional Consolidation to Policy Delivery 
No 15 / 2010 
Sven Biscop and Jo Coelmont, Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence: Building 
Effective European Armed Forces 
No 14 / 2010  
Antonio Missiroli, Implementing the Lisbon Treaty: The External Policy Dimension 
No 13 / 2010 
Anne-Céline Didier, The European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT): A New Way 
for Promoting Innovation in Europe? 
No 12 / 2010 
Marion Salines, Success Factors of Macro-Regional Cooperation: The Example of the 
Baltic Sea Region 
No 11 / 2010 
Martin Caudron, Galileo: Le Partenariat Public-Privé à l’Epreuve du  «Juste Retour»  
No 10 / 2009 
Davide Bradanini, The Rise of the Competitiveness Discourse—A Neo-Gramscian Analysis 
No 9 / 2009  
Adina Crisan, La Russie dans le nouveau Grand Jeu énergétique en Mer Noire: Nabucco et 
South Stream ou «l’art du kuzushi»  
 
 40 
No 8 / 2008 
Jonas Dreger, The Influence of Environmental NGOs on the Design of the Emissions 
Trading Scheme of the EU: An Application of the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
No 7 / 2008 
Thomas Kostera, Europeanizing Healthcare: Cross-border Patient Mobility and Its 
Consequences for the German and Danish Healthcare Systems 
06 / 2007 
Mathieu Rousselin, Le Multilatéralisme en Question: Le Programme de Doha pour le 
Développement et la Crise du Système Commercial Multilatéral 
05 / 2007 
Filip Engel, Analyzing Policy Learning in European Union Policy Formulation: The Advocacy 
Coalition Framework Meets New-Institutional Theory 
04 / 2007 
Michele Chang, Eric De Souza, Sieglinde Gstöhl, and Dominik Hanf, Papers prepared for the 
Colloquium, “Working for Europe: Perspectives on the EU 50 Years after the Treaties of 
Rome 
03 / 2007 
Erwin van Veen, The Valuable Tool of Sovereignty: Its Use in Situations of Competition and 
Interdependence 
02 / 2007 
Mark Pollack, Principal-Agent Analysis and International Delegation: Red Herrings, 
Theoretical Clarifications, and Empirical Disputes 
01 / 2006 
Christopher Reynolds, All Together Now? The Governance of Military Capability Reform in 
the ESDP 
 41 
  
Europe is in a constant state of flux. European politics, economics, law and indeed 
European societies are changing rapidly. The European Union itself is in a continuous 
situation of adaptation. New challenges and new requirements arise continually, both 
internally and externally.  
The College of Europe Studies series seeks to publish research on these issues done 
at the College of Europe, both at its Bruges and its Natolin (Warsaw) campus. Focused on 
the European Union and the European integration process, this research may be 
specialised in the areas of political science, law or economics, but much of it is of an 
interdisciplinary nature. The objective is to promote understanding of the issues 
concerned and to make a contribution to ongoing discussions. 
 
L’Europe subit des mutations permanentes. La vie politique, l’économie, le droit, 
mais également les sociétés européennes, changent rapidement. L’Union européenne 
s’inscrit dès lors dans un processus d’adaptation constant. Des défis et des nouvelles 
demandes surviennent sans cesse, provenant à la fois de l’intérieur et de l’extérieur. 
La collection des Cahiers du Collège d’Europe publie les résultats des recherches menées 
sur ces thèmes au Collège d’Europe, au sein de ses deux campus (Bruges et Varsovie). 
Focalisés sur l’Union européenne et le processus d’intégration, ces travaux peuvent être 
spécialisés dans les domaines des sciences politiques, du droit ou de l’économie, mais ils 
sont le plus souvent de nature interdisciplinaire. La collection vise à approfondir la 
compréhension de ces questions complexes et contribue ainsi au débat européen.
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